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Who Cares About Islamic Law?1 
 
 
The legal transplant in the Arab world, perhaps even in the 
Islamic world writ large, hasn’t had much luck by way of close 
study in US legal academia. Compared to its scholarly treatment in 
other non-Western contexts, such as Latin America and East Asia, 
the absence is glaring. This was not for want of scholarly interest 
in law in the Arab/Islamic world. Much has been published on 
Arab constitutions for instance, and you’ve had a few speakers in 
this lecture series, opine on the topic. Nor has there been lack of 
scholarly interest in types of legislation that had become 
symptomatic of our globalized world over the past two decades: 
foreign investment laws, intellectual property laws, oil and gas 
laws, and one must not forget that most unsavory yet pressing 
subject, national security and anti-terrorism laws. Rather, what is 
glaringly absent is the study of the “European Code”, the 
privileged form in which the legal transplant was first introduced 
only to become the permanent and defining feature of the 
contemporary legal system.  
There is a simple reason for this and I will state it bluntly. It is 
because Islamist scholars and their non-Muslim academic 
sympathizers either liberals with strong multicultural tendencies 
                                                        





or “traditionalists” hostile to the modern nation state, have 
hogged the study of law in the Arab/Islamic world. A consensus of 
sorts has for long emerged among this block of scholars that the 
legal transplant was a colonial imposition that has displaced, with 
tragic consequences according to these scholars, the organic law 
of the Muslim. It is the latter that is worthy of study, typically 
referred to by them as “Islamic law”.  
  
The crimes of the legal transplant seem endless according to the 
Islamist and co literature. And it all depends on where you want 
to put the “theoretical accent” so to speak. If you were an ethicist 
with an Islamist persuasion, you treated the transplant and its 
administrator modernist legal intelligentsia as symptomatic of the 
loss of a pre modern ethico-religious educational system with its 
learned juristic class, a loss that you then claimed caused all sorts 
of bad things including ethical disorientation among 
contemporary Muslims. You might even push the point further by 
attributing the violence of fundamentalist Islam today to this very 
ethical disorientation.  
 
If you were of the “traditionalist” persuasion hostile to the nation 
state, your position would be something of a spin off from the 
ethicist one, where you would treat “tradition” as a form of 
“discourse” that you argued the legal transplant displaced. 
Tradition is important because it provided the Muslim with a 
“world-view”-a way to know the world- that would be lost with 
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modernity, liberalism, humanism, secularism, all of which the 
legal transplant would somehow embody. According to this 
traditionalist, change could only come from within “tradition”-
from its bosom so to speak and only incrementally. Any 
“epistemological” rupture this tradition might suffer would be 
calamitous and a legal transplant from-liberal, humanist, secular 
Europe-with its own intelligentsia administrator class would be 
exactly that.   
 
You might have somewhat of a romantic version of the olden days 
of “tradition”, in which case you would represent the advent of the 
legal transplant as a sign of the fallen times never to be recovered. 
According to this version, in the Muslim pre modern times, jurists 
and faithful functioned as an organic unit that was distinctly 
separate from rulers. The latter came and went, but the tight 
embrace of jurist and faithful community was continuous over 
time and outlasted the rotating dynasties of rulers. In this 
embrace, jurists ruled according to the needs of the community 
with whom they were organically connected. Something akin to 
the (in)famous Qadi justice. I call this a romantic version because 
the image is of a “unity” that is not riven with internal social 
conflicts. The legal transplant came and it blew all that to 
smithereens.  
 
If you were of an “anti-imperialist” persuasion, you would ascribe 
to the legal transplant the role of facilitating colonial rule by 
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centralizing the legal system and codifying the books of the 
Ulama. Centralization and codification you would then argue 
turned an otherwise pluralistic pre modern legal system with 
various jurists espousing different opinions on the same legal 
issue into a uniform, rule-based formalist system of the 
continental variety. The reader is then expected to experience a 
great deal of dismay reading this because surely a pluralist system 
was superior to a rule-based formalist one as the former gave the 
judge or jurist options for ruling and room to maneuver while the 
latter did not.  
 
And if you were of the liberal legal publicist persuasion, you 
would attribute to the old ulama class the functional role of 
preserving the “separation of powers” from the ruler (the 
executive) a role that you would then argue was lost with their 
demise as transplant displaced jurists’ law. The consequences 
could only be described as dire: marginalizing the only check on 
authoritarian rule led to the entrenchment of the latter in the 
Muslim world.   
 
It follows then that given its outsider status and disruptive sins 
too innumerable to count, the European legal transplant in the 
Muslim world should be discarded as “superfluous” and unworthy 
of academic study. Scholarly interest should more properly be 
directed to studying that which was lost, and figuring out ways in 
which to redeem it. Reconnecting Muslim to Muslims’ law from 
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which he was unjustly and rudely separated should be academics’ 
most urgent project.  
Thus there seems to be scholarly consensus in the US about the 
law of the Muslim world, which if you break it down turns out to 
be a consensus about law as an expression of identity.  Law might 
mean different things to different people in the world writ large, 
but for “Muslims”, law is primarily a depository of identity.  
 
The assertion that for Muslims law is primarily a depository of 
identity seems to me to suggest a dual political project, the one 
implied in the other, namely, turning the meaning of “Muslim”-
who is properly a Muslim?- and the meaning of “law”-what counts 
properly as this Muslim’s law?_ into a locus of debate, even 
conflict. If the social tapestry in the “Muslim” world is boiling with 
various loci of conflict, around wealth distribution, around rights 
and liberties, around political representation, the Islamist 
proposition-adopted by Amerian academia- is to open one around 
the identity of the Muslim and his law. It is an invitation to 
discourse on identity by turning it into a question of debate.  
 
While the Islamist project in the Muslim world has experienced a 
great deal of success vis a vis the first leg of the proposition-who 
is a Muslim?- it has yet to become victorious on the second: 
Muslim’s law.  
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Let me explain what I mean by telling you a story. Over the 
summer, I was approached by BBC Radio Britain to debate an 
author who had co-authored a book on the Gay International, its 
virtues and vices, entitled, “Queer Wars”. The “Gay International” 
is as some of you I am sure know, is premised on international 
advocacy of gay rights driven by highly motivated Western gay 
activists. The book was interesting and covered several regions in 
the world where local gay rights struggle was unfolding.  While 
the authors adopted as their background position the common 
“cultural imperialism is bad”, as one would expect from academic 
authors these days, they nevertheless took a nuanced position 
towards the various regions they discussed in the book 
highlighting the complexity of the labor of international solidarity. 
How, yes, it might help local activists to receive international 
support and how, no, it might sometimes hurt them by exposing 
them to attack and inciting open public homophobia. Except, they, 
the authors that is, seemed clear that the Muslim world was not a 
place where such “nuance” might hold. Their attitude in relation 
to that “Muslim world” was simple: don’t even go there! 
 
When I pushed back and insisted that there were indeed gay 
rights activists in the Muslim world, that they too needed 
“measured” international support and only when they asked for it, 
and that there was indeed a difference, which the authors of the 
book seemed to confuse between “internationalism” and 
“universalism”, the former a question of political deliberation 
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about the merits of international solidarity, while the latter a 
question of principle that applied to Muslims just like everybody 
else for Muslims too have universalist aspirations, my interlocutor 
begged to differ. Not wise for Muslims, he repeated. Too 
dangerous, he warned the BBC listening audience. The debate was 
fast-paced, intense and lasted only twenty minutes. I emerged 
from it feeling bruised. I felt that somebody had just thrown a 
bucket of identity at me and asked me to sit in it. What was 
uncanny was that my interlocutor experienced himself as 
adopting a “progressive” position. 
 
Why am I telling you this story? Because turning the “Muslim” –a 
complex social being-into a homo Islamicus-a bearer of identity- is 
an Islamist project. In fact, I think that the Islamist project is 
premised on equating the Muslim with the homo Islamicus –
turning one into the other- by dropping from its account the 
multiple ways of Islamist governance taking place over the past 
three decades or so that had produced this “Muslim”, the 
privileged subject of Islamist discourse. That is ever since what is 
commonly referred to proudly among Islamists as “The Islamic 
Awakening” peeked out its head in our midst.  Failing to see the 
ways in which this “Muslim” had been produced becomes then the 
progressive marker, the point of pride, the moral certitude, of the 
liberal multiculturalist like my interlocutor on the BBC radio 
show. No gay rights for you Muslims because “gay” and “rights” 
are foreign to who you are! 
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At 54 years of age, and having born witness to the rise and 
mounting influence of this Islamic Awakening among my peers, I 
can give you a brief account of how I myself experienced it 
especially as a woman. There is nothing dramatic in what I am 
about to say, so don’t expect stories of cuttings, whippings, and 
stone throwing. Nothing that would draw your pity juices, or your 
tears of sympathy for the “oriental” woman, nothing that would 
invoke the “violence” that would offend your Western liberal 
sensibilities. It was all “voluntary” as the young Muslim feminists 
of today- and their Western cohorts of the third wave-like to 
assert! It was all voluntary, in a Saba Mahmoud kind of way. 
 
The women of my generation witnessed the emergence, and soon 
enough, hegemony, of what I will call “The Muslim woman 
governance”. This “Muslim” woman appeared from our midst: our 
family, our school, our workplace, and our neighborhood. She was 
like us, and then one day, she was no longer. She “separated 
herself from us” either affectively or socially or both because she 
found a God that inspired her to submit to him. This God asked 
her to cover herself so she wore Hijab. She covered her hair, 
pulled her sleeves to her wrists and her skirt to her ankles. She 
promised us his rewards if we were to veil ourselves too and 
when we ignored her she threatened us with his rage. The torture 
of the grave was only the beginning of our after death 
punishment-ordeal for failing to obey his commands- when, 
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according to the “Muslim woman”, we would be asked by an 
archangel why we refused to veil ourselves during our lifetimes 
and failing the test, we would be doomed to the “torture of the 
grave”. Worms and snakes would crawl up our exposed non hijabi 
skin and …well you can imagine where this horror scenario is 
going. 
 
My generation witnessed the increasing success of this “Muslim 
woman”: we would meet with our girlfriends to celebrate 
someone’s birthday, and one of them would show up having 
adorned al hijab; we would go to school or to work and see a 
classmate or colleague enter the room, shape transformed with 
Hijab, we would go on a family visit and a cousin would proudly 
saunter her way through the room hijab covered.  
 
With the increased success of this Muslim woman and the 
hegemony of her hijab our non Hijabi attire came to be signified 
through differentiation as the dress of those Westernized 
outsiders, or of those non believing “kuffar”, or of those 
promiscuous harlots who want to seduce men; then towards the 
end and as hijab became the costume of the majority, non hijab 
became simply the attire of “Christians”. [Christians here is 
reference to the Christian minority of the population, for even 
prostitutes decided to don the hijab.]  
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It was an astonishing feat! Testimony not just to the success of 
Islamism as a social governance project but also, to how its 
epistemology relied upon this social governance project as 
ongoing background fact. It is when what we wore – whatever 
that was- became understood socially as the negative of hijab-
(non) hijab- and when it became so unusual to come upon it in 
public space, so much so that its wearer acquired the signification 
“Christian woman”, it is then that the term “Muslim Woman”, 
acquired its positivist meaning. To put this in less bullshitty terms, 
you can’t have a “Muslim woman” a term much bandied about 
these days, unless you’ve had a social project whose goal it was to 
create a referent to this term, a person whose social profile fit the 
signifier “Muslim woman”. 
  
The whole thing was pretty darn awful especially if you were a 
Christian woman. If you were, it was a double whammy. You 
found yourself “Christianized” twice: both as a member of a 
community now itself defined as “ the Christians” who the 
Islamists rushed to assure us “have their own rights too”, seeing 
your political citizenship swapped for sectarian membership, and 
as one who wears her Christianity on her back-or rather her 
“head”- in the form of a dress that screamed’ “here walks a 
Christian”.  
 
It wasn’t that when this Hijab of the “Muslim woman” hit our 
shores that we were not or did not see ourselves as Muslim. We 
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were and did, very much so. Our non-hijab was already modest. 
We lived our lives-our friendships, romances, and work relations- 
with men as one would expect women to do in a socially 
conservative society. There was of course room to maneuver, 
interpret, play around and rebel in secret. But the discourse 
around women’s bodies, dress, and sexuality was and remains to 
this day supremely conservative.  I tried to explain the way all that 
worked –the norm and resistance to it-in my article on Honor 
Killings so I refer you to it shamelessly.  
 
The “Muslim Awakening” came and made this non-hijab-rather 
our bodies themselves- a locus of identity conflict and it did so by 
declaring our dress un-Islamic. This was open season on our 
bodies. Not only did we find our bodies suddenly the center of 
public debates about the propriety of our public appearance, with 
men as born again Muslims speaking as the supreme authoritative 
voices, whether in our own families, places of education, work 
places or from the on high of the minaret, but it also exposed us to 
the discipline of the street as street harassment put the rising 
hegemony of Islamist doctrine into practice. We became fidgety 
walkers, anxious about our public appearance, pulling our sleeves 
down to the wrists, skirts down to the ankles, cleavage up to neck, 
mimicking the hijab even when we were not hijabis. The Islamist 
social governance project was now enacted on the very surface of 
our skin and deep inside our neuroses. I am reminded of all this 
when I go back home to visit and I see the hijabi women in my 
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family rummage frantically reaching out for their scarves to cover 
their head whenever a “strange” man entered the room. That we 
didn’t do.  
 
Social governance had turned into self-governance.  
It was as if we transitioned within the family from the episteme of 
“shame”-ayb in Arabic-back when we were a socially conservative 
society that was Muslim- to the episteme of the religiously 
prohibited or “haram” in Arabic- when we became Islamism’s 
homo-Islamicus. Within the first episteme, we negotiated our 
dress with our mothers who reminded us warningly: “What 
would the neighbors say if they saw you dressed like that?”  
aghast at our shorter than usual skirts. We would argue, plead, 
explain, and offer compromises. Sometimes we won, making our 
way out of the house feeling victorious, and sexy, other times we 
lost, making our way back to our room feeling miffed and angry, 
mumbling to ourselves about the God-awful backwardness of our 
folk!  
 
Within the second episteme, haram- when our dresses became the 
locus of public debate, no longer just “the talk of the neighbors” 
but that of the street, radio, Television, minaret, we came to 
negotiate our dress with our born-again Muslim brother (or 
neighbor, or local shopkeeper, or cabdriver) who spoke to us 
authoritatively in the name of the divine law. Our dress had 
entered with Islamicization a new discourse, one informed by 
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“Islamic law” –or haram-it has become if you wish “legalized”- and 
for it to exit the domain of the prohibited and enter the domain of 
the permitted- as Islamists like to say, it had to be subjected to a 
divine test about what could be revealed and what could not, how 
much hands, how much feet, how much tightness, how much 
color. It was no longer the neighbors who were watching, it was 
the very eyes of God and not so lovingly. We were often reminded 
of his wrath if we disobeyed. It was as if our attire passed from 
our mothers’ “rational basis” test to our religious brother’s 
“intermediate” or even “strict scrutiny” one.  
 
Where is this going you ask yourselves and what has any of this to 
do with the legal transplant? Well, I kind of think of the legal 
transplant as like our pre hijab dress when we were simply 
Muslim. Like that dress it became the locus of identity conflict that 
Islamists had succeeded in triggering in the rest of the social body. 
And like our pre-hijab, this positive law or al Qanun Al Wad’ee as 
Islamists like to refer to it disparagingly, it was sufficiently 
Muslim, it was kind’a Muslim, Muslim in a way nobody paid 
attention to really or cared about, it was Muslim by default. Like 
our dress, it was simply Muslim. It certainly had other problems, 
but an Islamist strict scrutiny test of its identity was not going to 
fix them. In fact, that proved to be nothing but a terrible 
distraction, the kind that the right wing succeeds in doing by 
recasting the problems of society in terms of threat to the tight 
organic state that society was imagined to be before blacks, 
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migrants, feminists, etc despoiled it. For Islamists, it was before 
the modern state and its secular Code despoiled it. 
 
What is interesting is that this Islamist project of subjecting the 
“European” Code to the test of Islamicity experienced something 
of a golden age, albeit a brief one, with the rise of 
constitutionalism in the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet 
Union. Like their peers in other places, constitutional courts in the 
Arab world, for complex reasons that I won’t get into, became 
increasingly open to the idea of judicial review of legislation. 
Silent constitutional articles such as “Sharia is the sole source of 
legislation” suddenly came to life, as the practice of judicial review 
became the hottest law story in town. Different kinds of 
legislation became judicially reviewed including ones, through 
pressure from Islamist litigants, considered not “properly 
Islamic”.  
 
Islamic law scholars based in US academia chipped in with their 
constitutional law proposals in a parallel movement of rise in 
constitutional law scholarship. Some returned to books of Muslim 
jurists, dusted off a few terms and used them to express 
constitutionalism in Islamic terms, hoping to influence the way 
simply Muslim judges approached their otherwise unfamiliar task. 
Some offered ways to fashion the Islamicity test in a way that was 
“normative” rather than strictly “doctrinal”, and some saw in 
constitutionalism a way to sneak back “Islamic law”, in a kind of a 
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silent coup d’etat in which Muslim’s jurist law acting as a form of 
“natural law” refashioned, incrementally, rule by rule, the 
culturally alien positive law. Judges performing judicial review 
were praised for their “Muslim reasonable” ways, reassuring 
Western readership that constitutionalism a “Muslim-reasonable” 
way was what was needed in the Arab world and that there were 
judges to boot already in place who could pull it all off.   
 
This was not an enterprise that was devoid of anxiety. Islamist 
litigants had a knack for attacking reform legislation touching on 
women or religious minorities or freedom of expression and the 
liberal scholar needed to open the Sharia door without letting in 
those that would discredit it. While those scholars with liberal 
sensibility set to work trying to come up with an Islamic doctrine 
that was “authoritative but not authoritarian”, others declined the 
defensive posture altogether and adopted instead the more 
aggressive “difference” counter attack. In this posture, anything 
that appeared on its face offensive to liberal humanist sensibility 
was presented as “difference” that required understanding. In 
other words, others went for the epistemological relativist 
jugular. (Not lawyers!) 
 
If you were an Islamic law scholar based in US academia and for a 
good stretch of two decades, those were exciting times for you. 
Judicial review and Sharia as the sole source of legislation gave 
you the feeling that your work was relevant, that many lonely 
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hours spent deciphering what dead brown men said in the tenth 
century about the different levels of legality to characterize an 
action was definitely worth it. Gulf countries with oil money to 
spend lavished elite law schools in the US with money to set up 
programs on Islamic law that gave value to your scholarship. 
What you wrote was inserted inside the circuit of conferences and 
symposiums financed by those programs. What you wrote was 
hot stuff; it was on demand.  
 
And this was a very good position to be in. The rising prestige of 
US legal academia after the fall of the Berlin Wall made your 
presence in it during this time a stroke of darn good luck. What 
you wrote rode an already traveling vehicle of US academic 
prestige and was being transported back to the “Muslim” world in 
a way that was not possible before. You had a good shot at being 
famous. The near collapse of academic institutions in those 
countries, worn out by years of failing developmental states, made 
their scholarship unable to compete. Whatever scholarship was 
produced was either objectively inferior or acquired a secondary 
status to your own given its very local location. You could afford 
to be ignorant of what they did-though increasingly they could not 
afford to be ignorant of you.   
 
I mustn’t forget to mention- my pet peeve as I will explain in a 
minute- that you also benefited from the US legal theory “cannon” 
all of which you used in your Islamic legal reconstructive project. 
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All of this made you sound smart, different, and original; you 
turned Islamic law, an impossibly tedious topic to multitudes of 
law students in the Arab/ Muslim world, into something exciting, 
something intellectual almost. With the rise of Islamism, your 
scholarship reassured young born-again Muslims that they could 
be born again and intellectually sophisticated at the same time by 
reading your scholarship. You were the “Muslim” jurist they had 
not seen before and wished they did.  
 
With the Arab spring and the rising fortunes of the Muslim 
Brotherhood in Egypt, there was a moment, especially with the 
passage of the Islamist Constitution of 2012, when you felt that 
you were something of a jurist-in-waiting. There was a 
constitution that was perfectly tailored to give your scholarship a 
consultative status; surely, it was only a question of time before 
you received a phone call to become the next sitting-Ikhwan 
approved-justice on the Egyptian Supreme Court.  
 
Alas with the mass demonstrations in June of 2013 against the 
Ikhwan and their quick and cruel demise, all this came crashing 
down. Just when you thought the Muslim had finally merged with 
the homo Islamicus becoming indistinguishable-(the election 
results after the fall of Mubarak certainly seemed to promise as 
much)-and the world was ready for an “authoritative albeit not 
authoritarian Islamic law”, Egyptian crowds came out by the 
hundreds of thousands decrying the “Islamists” and their ways. 
 18 
“They acted like a closed sect”; “they treated themselves as the 
knowing few whose mission was to educate us on Islam the 
misguided many”; “they were only interested in their own”…was 
some of the things you heard!  
 
Oops! It turns out that “the authoritative and the authoritarian” 
were closely aligned in people’s experience when it comes to 
fixing their Islam. People were clamoring to become simply Muslim 
again. 
 
So what do you do NOW? ISIS is everywhere on the news. A whole 
war, a global war, is declared on them and them alone. They kill 
invoking the name of Allah. They invoke the rules of the Islamic. Is 
this Islamic? They ask you everywhere you go. You are exhausted 
trying to explain to them this was not “an Islam you recognize”. It 
takes some work but you are already thinking your days of glory 
have proven brief, much too brief. You explain, this was 
Wahabism, a purist fundamentalist strand of Islam financed by 
Saudi Arabia. It was a mistake for Egypt to forcibly remove the 
Ikhwan from power; we warned them violence would only beget 
more violence and would empower the fundamentalists. You try 
again: Muslims have lost their way with the corrupt modern 
secular state. They have become ethically disoriented. They 
cannot tell right from wrong. And when it comes to homegrown 
terrorism, Islamophobia breeds violence, you assert.  
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You bravely soldier on with explanations, that is until a journalist 
calls to ask you whether it was Islamic for a 14 year old boy to 
refuse to shake the hands of his female school teacher as is 
customary practice in Swiss schools and whether you thought the 
little town in Switzerland that passed an ordinance fining any 
student who refused to do so was Islamophobic. You feel like 
throwing your phone against the wall. While you didn’t quite 
mind being the mufti, it was not this kind exactly.  You find 
yourself thinking how is it that what promised to be a position of 
Justice on the Egyptian Supreme Court ended up seeing you 
playing the role of a mufti on the demands for exception of a 
Muslim minority in the West, while fending off questions about 
ISIS and Islamist violence.  
 
What I am trying to say is that the Islamic law project that found a 
friendly home in US academia has reached a dead end. With its 
eye on transforming the legal system of the Muslim world, its 
advocates find themselves today in a defensive position trying to 
explain Islamist violence as it peeks its head in bursts almost on a 
daily level, or alternatively, acting as mediators between a liberal 
legal system and a religious minority clamoring for its own 
Islamic exception. 
 
This is all a shame in my view because this project has hogged 
resources, intellectual, symbolic and financial that could have 
gone elsewhere. It could have gone to rescuing the positive legal 
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system in the Arab/Muslim world, the descendant from the legal 
transplant, from its jurisprudential glut. All the elements were 
there to do so. A revolution in rights advocacy had already started 
in the nineties and showed its metal with the Arab spring. Rights 
and liberties driven youth led the crowds assertively to the 
overthrow of Mubarak. Equally assertively they approached the 
courts. They read their constitution closely and argued their 
rights from the provision of its articles. If the resources that went 
to “Islamic law”, in which the Muslim was singled out as an 
exception to the Comparative law of everyone else, and instead 
went to lending “a theoretical hand” to the rights movement that 
was a brewing, especially from US based legal theory, the most 
innovative and developed in the world, we would be at a different 
place today. Instead we seem to have been sidetracked by a long 
and windy conversation on identity and difference, when all the 
while we should have been talking about rights and liberties.   
 
 
 
  
 
 
